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Abstract
Research in environmental epigenetics explores how environmental exposures and life experiences such as food, toxins,
stress or trauma can shape trajectories of human health and well-being in complex ways. This perspective resonates with
social science expertise on the significant health impacts of unequal living conditions and the profound influence of social
life on bodies in general. Environmental epigenetics could thus provide an important opportunity for moving beyond long-
standing debates about nature versus nurture between the disciplines and think instead in ‘biosocial’ terms across the dis-
ciplines. Yet, beyond enthusiasm for such novel interdisciplinary opportunities, it is crucial to also reflect on the scientific,
social and political challenges that a biosocial model of body, health and illness might entail. In this paper, we contribute
historical and social science perspectives on the political opportunities and challenges afforded by a biosocial conception of
the body. We will specifically focus on what it means if biosocial plasticity is not only perceived to characterize the life of
individuals but also as possibly giving rise to semi-stable traits that can be passed on to future generations. That is, we will
consider the historical, social and political valences of the scientific proposition of transgenerational epigenetic inheritance.
The key question that animates this article is if and how the notion of transgenerational epigenetic inheritance creates new
forms of responsibilities both in science and in society. We propose that, ultimately, interdisciplinary conversation and col-
laboration is essential for responsible approaches to transgenerational epigenetic inheritance in science and society.
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Introduction
Environmental epigenetics is a burgeoning life science discipline
that is receiving significant attention not only from researchers
within biology and biomedicine, but increasingly also from the so-
cial sciences [1–4]. For many social scientists who study the social
and political dimensions of the biological sciences, environmental
epigenetics represents an important opening of biological
reasoning towards accounting for the influence of the social envi-
ronment on body and health on the molecular level. Such perspec-
tives were mostly absent from genetic views on basic biology and
disease aetiology [5]. Researchers in the social sciences often
viewed such gene-focused models critically because they seemed
to have little purchase on better understanding the unequal distri-
bution of health and illness in society and tended to reduce such
phenomena to the mere expression of underlying genetic traits.
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Perspectives
Gene-centric explanations were also significantly at odds
with expertise in the social sciences that detailed the significant
health impact of unequal living conditions and the profound in-
fluence of social life on bodies in general [6]. In contrast, re-
search in environmental epigenetics that explores how
environmental exposures and life experiences such as food,
toxins, stress or trauma might shape trajectories of human
health has been perceived to resonate with social science per-
spectives on the relationship between body, health and envi-
ronment. Environmental epigenetics is understood as providing
an important opportunity for possibly moving beyond long-
standing debates about nature versus nurture between the dis-
ciplines and thinking instead in ‘biosocial’ or ‘biocultural’ terms
across the disciplines [7–11]. Perspectives on the human body as
“interconnected, plastic, permeable and responsive to changes
in its surroundings” [12] that are currently emerging in environ-
mental epigenetics, as well as in related fields such social neu-
roscience, nutrigenomics or behavioural microbiomics [13]
could thus create new innovative links between biology and so-
cial science and serve as starting points for the interdisciplinary
exploration of the complex entanglements of social life and bio-
logical processes.
Yet, beyond enthusiasm for the novel interdisciplinary op-
portunities afforded by convergent perspectives in biology and
the social sciences, it is crucial to also reflect on the scientific,
social and political challenges that a biosocial model of body,
health and illness might entail. In this paper, we thus contribute
perspectives from the history of science (Meloni) as well as from
the social studies of science (Mu¨ller) on this emergent concep-
tion of the body as biosocial and explore its social and political
implications. We will specifically focus on what it means if bio-
social plasticity is not only perceived to characterize the life of
individuals but also as possibly giving rise to semi-stable traits
that can be passed on to future generations. That is, we will
consider the historical, social and political valences of the scien-
tific proposition of transgenerational epigenetic inheritance.
The key question that animates this article is if and how a pos-
sibly emerging notion of transgenerational epigenetic inheri-
tance could create new forms of responsibilities both in science
and in society and how these responsibilities could be
addressed productively.
We will start by discussing historical links between a bioso-
cial conception of the body and politics. Our aim is to show that
the notion of a plastic body open to environmental and social
influences was prominent in many biological and medical theo-
ries before the rise of modern genetics. Drawing on historical
examples, we will highlight that notions of a plastic human bi-
ology were historically entangled with a wide range of political
positions including, unfortunately, perspectives that viewed
some groups in society as inferior to others, such as racist,
sexist, classist or eugenic positions. We present these
historical examples as cautionary tales that remind us that per-
spectives that emphasize a biosocial plasticity of the human body
are not only able to support a greater awareness of social justice
questions with regard to health and illness, but can also contrib-
ute to positions that further stigmatize and discriminate against
socially disadvantaged and vulnerable groups.
In a second step, we will then explore if findings from con-
temporary environmental epigenetics also hold the potential to
both empower and stigmatize individuals and groups that
might appear as negatively affected by environmental expo-
sures. We will review how notions of health risks across genera-
tions change as we move from a genetic to an epigenetic model
of body, health and illness, and discuss which forms of scientific
and social responsibility might emerge with notions of transge-
nerational epigenetic inheritance. We propose that, ultimately,
interdisciplinary collaboration is essential for addressing these
challenges responsibly in science and society.
Throughout the text we will use the term biosocial plasticity
to denote notions of a body that is open to transformation in re-
sponse to outside influences. We do so for two reasons. First,
we want to be specific about what kind of plasticity of the body
we are referring to when plasticity is spoken of in this text.
While plasticity can also denote processes of developmental
variability (e.g. in stem cells) that are not necessarily related to
exposures and experiences in the environment outside the
body, the type of biological plasticity that we are discussing
denotes phenotypic changes that occur in response to envi-
ronmental cues. Second, working with the term ‘biosocial plas-
ticity’ is an explicit attempt to bridge biological discourse,
which more often uses the term plasticity to speak about
gene-environment interactions, and social science discourse,
where the term ‘biosocial’ has gained momentum as a short-
hand for denoting the complex interplay between biological
matter and sociocultural processes. By adding ‘biosocial’ to the
more common biological terminology of ‘plasticity’ we aim to
contribute to possibly building a mutually accessible yet exact
vocabulary across the two discourses to further potential
collaborations.
Historical Perspectives on Biosocial Plasticity
and the Inheritance of Acquired Traits
Epigenetics poses a number of important social and ethical
questions that are far from being just theoretical or abstract.
For instance: If epigeneticists claim that when I am eating,
“I am eating for two” [14], implying that a future parent’s diet
has an impact on the offspring’s wellbeing on the level of gene
expression, how does this change notions of responsibility and
risk, normality and pathology [15]? If the genome can be dam-
aged through smoking or optimized through exercise, will we
not monitor people’s lifestyles more closely, thereby “creating
ever more moralised domains and responsibilities” for health
and illness [16]? And whose lifestyles will be monitored in par-
ticular? Not all bodies are considered equally permeable, and
the degree of attention towards how the environment affects
the body appears highly gendered, particularly when it comes
to hereditary effects. If it is in the womb that many epigenetic
effects are “programmed”, should greater attention and more
obligations be placed on pregnant women [17]? Might epigenetic
knowledge indeed increase the momentum of current pre-
conception health care initiatives that extend the timeframes of
policing women’s behaviour even into periods far before preg-
nancy [18]? And how might epigenetics impact the social percep-
tion of groups and individuals who have been subjected to
negative exposures such as trauma, war or famine? Will they be
perceived as harmed and therefore in need of reparation? Or will
they be considered as damaged and possibly marked for life? [19]?
Compared to 20th century debates based on notions of
mostly stable and unchanging genes, these questions are fairly
new, while what is entirely new is the knowledge of the molecu-
lar mechanisms that now connect external exposure (toxins,
food, stress) to changes in genomic expressions. However, the
notions that bodies can be profoundly altered by environmental
cues is much older and was pervasive in Western and non-
Western medicine before and during the rise of the modern bio-
medical body that is conceived as much more separate from its
2 | Environmental Epigenetics, 2018, Vol. 4, No. 2
environment. Environmental themes in medical thinking have
existed since the time of the first Hippocratic school, when
food, winds or waters were deemed key factors in shaping not
only individual bodies but whole group traits and characteris-
tics [20]. Even the notion of the inheritance of acquired charac-
teristics and the interplay of nurture and nature in shaping
heredity, often attributed to Lamarck, are actually clearly out-
lined in ancient medical writings [21]. In the Hippocratic “On
Airs, Waters and Places” we find, for instance, the description of
a mythical population, the Macrocephaly (literally: the large-
headed ones), whose unusually elongated skulls were consid-
ered the result of “usage”, that is, the effect of the local practice
of fashioning the head with bandages to alter its original form.
However, as the Hippocratic text notices, after the first genera-
tions had applied these efforts on the head, at a certain point
“force” was no longer necessary as “nature cooperates with
usage” so that the acquired trait is transmitted “naturally”—
that is, “usage has nothing to do with it” (On Airs, Waters, Places,
part 14 in [20], p. 161).
Our delving into historical examples to contextualize current
developments is not to suggest that one can conflate all these
different historical examples of thinking with biosocial plastic-
ity into a smooth continuity of thought before and after the rise
of modern biomedicine. Hippocratic themes in the ancient
world were fairly different from those of eighteenth century
Britain [22]. The inheritance of acquired characters in ancient
authors lacked, for example, the creative power of the organism
that some neo-Lamarckian authors speculated about [23]. It is
also not the goal of this article to discuss continuities and differ-
ences between different forms of thinking with biosocial plas-
ticity across history in minute detail. However, when it comes
to the sociological implications of understanding the human
body as deeply open to environmental influences, the ethical
and political concerns raised by these in other respects indeed
differing ideas also offer a number of important continuities.
They do so particularly with regard to how they address social
categories such as gender, race and class, as we shall argue in
the two following sections.
Impressionable Mothers
A stunning example of such kinds of continuities is the notion
of maternal impression, which has stubbornly crossed different
cultural and medical frameworks from ancient and early mod-
ern biology into the early twentieth century. ‘Maternal impres-
sion’ describes the idea that the thoughts, emotions and
experiences of a pregnant woman could ‘imprint’ on the physi-
ology of her unborn child [24–27]. Stories of maternal imprints
as a result of observing events, objects, statues and people are
widespread in ancient and early modern medicine. Many stories
describe the effects of experiencing or witnessing a traumatic
event (as we would put it in our contemporary terminology) on
a pregnant woman, such as being present at a public execution
or encountering a wild animal. Maternal biology was considered
plastic enough to be impressed by the power of the emotions
and thoughts engendered by these disturbing events. This in
turn would affect the physiology of the developing foetus. This
is why the doctrine of maternal impressions often came with
specific prescriptions regarding the behaviour of pregnant
women. A popular medical textbook in the 18th century, for ex-
ample, recommended that “[a pregnant woman] ought to dis-
creetly suppress all anger, passion, and other perturbations of
mind, and avoid entertaining too serious or melancholic
thoughts; since all such tend to impress a depravity of nature
upon the infant’s mind, and deformity on its body”, (Maubray,
1724, cited in [28], p. 42). The idea of maternal impressions and
the plastic and mediating nature of female bodies was thus inti-
mately connected to moral prescriptions about how women
were supposed to conduct themselves in order to ensure the
well-being of their offspring.
It is telling that as recently as 1915, an unnamed editor of
the Journal of Heredity, a key publication of the genetics (and eu-
genics) movement, felt the urgency to contrast the superstitious
nature of “what is commonly called maternal impression, pre-
natal culture, ‘marking,’ and so on” with emerging genetic ideas
of inheritance. It is disconcerting, the editor claimed, that we
still find nowadays in popular science publications on baby care
claims such as that “[t]he woman who frets brings forth a ner-
vous child. The woman who rebels generally bears a morbid
child.” Or that “self-control, cheerfulness and love for the little
life breathing in unison with your own will practically insure
you a child of normal physique and nerves.” The unsigned edi-
torial had two main goals. One was scientific: showing that
most of the changes to the embryo occur at a period when the
mother is still unaware of her pregnancy and in such a general
form that she is unable to intervene directly in any way.
However, there was also a more subtle and complex moral aim:
not only to free mothers from the burden of a moralistic respon-
sibility “which [they] need not bear”, as the editorial states, but,
more substantially, to avoid any distractions from the eugenic
movement and its key messages of hard heredity. From the
perspective of a truly selectionist approach to eugenic matters,
a focus on prenatal life that attributed to mothers not only the
burden but also the power of shaping heredity through their
behaviours was just a waste of energy [29]. The text is still worth
reading today as an interesting conundrum regarding the often
undecidable back and forth between moral assumptions and
scientific claims, and the ambiguous positioning of notions of
both biological fixedness and biosocial plasticity with regard to
gender and heredity. Was a genetic view of heredity a liberation
for women from an unjustified responsibility to the foetus? Or
was it instead an impoverished view of pregnancy that sub-
tracted agency from the maternal body?
The notion of maternal impressions and its history illustrate
how scientific discussions about the role pregnancy played in
heredity were also always debates about the social role of moth-
ers and their moral obligations towards their unborn children.
However, at the same time, it becomes visible that at any point
in history, including today, social conventions and norms of
motherhood and maternal responsibility have also shaped sci-
entific questions and research designs in the first place, making
some research questions more likely than others [4, 30].
Scientific and social understandings of the role of maternal bod-
ies and lives for the health and well-being of their offspring
hence are always co-produced and never independent of each
other.
Biosocial Plasticity and the History of Racism
Historically, notions of biological plasticity have not only played
a role in explaining differences between individuals—for exam-
ple between those whose mothers had witnessed traumatic
events and those whose had not—and in gendered notions of
morality, but they were also used to explain so-called ‘racial’
differences. Especially in ancient and early modern times,
claims about the assumed ‘superiority’ of certain human groups
were not necessarily considered to be the result of a fixed and
invariable heredity (what we would consider today as genetic
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inheritance), but as consequences of the accumulated effects of
climate and location on body and mind. Often, populations liv-
ing in tropical areas were viewed as inferior because they were
considered to have been rendered ‘lazy’ or ‘luxurious’ by the
effects of a constant hot and humid climate [31]. Many authors
before the 17th century considered that any of these so-called
‘racial’ traits could be, albeit with effort, changed through relo-
cation to another place, as humans were considered to—like
plants—change their characteristics when moved to another
terrain [32]. This connection of place and physical traits was, at
that time, both a source of anxiety (the fear of degeneration in
hotter climates and through specific foods) and hope (the
chance of regeneration through the ‘right’ climate and the
‘right’ foods), particularly among the colonizing nations. These
anxieties informed, for example, colonial practices of rejecting
indigenous lifestyles and foods [33].
While, in theory, biosocial plasticity was considered to give
rise to both degeneration or regeneration, in colonial contexts,
plasticity was mostly understood as a source of degeneration
and served to legitimize claims of European superiority. This
biased outcome was partially a product of theories that
proposed that the colonized were simultaneously more and less
plastic than the colonizers. This strategic usage of biosocial
plasticity in colonial contexts remained an important trope in
the nineteenth century, when other views of the plastic body
and heredity, for instance Lamarckism, took shape. The colo-
nized were considered more plastic because they were deemed
more at the mercy of their physical environment than coloniz-
ing Europeans; at the same time, they were considered as less
responsive to attempts at regeneration. Even non-Lamarckians
adopted this language. For example, the evolutionary theorist
Alfred Wallace claimed that the “remotely ancient representa-
tives of the human species”—which is how he referred to the in-
digenous inhabitants of colonized lands—“were in their then
wild state much more plastic than now to external nature” [34,
p. 42]. That means that while plasticity was referred to as the or-
igin of ‘racial’ inferiority, plasticity as a potential source of ac-
quiring equality was, at the same time, denied [35]. The idea
that the colonized had, in the past, lost all their potential for
change, e.g. in response to beneficial living conditions, because
of acquired habits that had become engrained into their bodies
was one of the key themes of nineteenth century plasticity-
based forms of racism [19]. Here we find a two-step process of
argumentation that is characteristic of how notions of biosocial
plasticity were historically used to further racist and eugenic
arguments: first, by attributing to distinct groups in society a
specific vulnerability to outside influences. Second, by arguing
that these groups have been exposed to negative influences in
ways that render intervention mostly meaningless because the
attributed ‘biological damage’ is framed as hardly reversible.
This sequence of arguments illustrates the profoundly ambigu-
ous relationship between notions of biosocial plasticity and
processes of racialization. On the one hand, they contributed to
a weakening of notions of racial stability and inborn essences
through which modern racialist thought has prevalently
proceeded. On the other hand, they have contributed to the
ongoing racialization of social groups and the re-inscription of
racial categories. They have done so, in particular, by arguing
that certain human groups have shared a common social
experience that has hardened into a biological reality which
now defines their embodied identity [36]. A closer look at these
historical formations also teaches us to carefully consider how
contemporary biosocial research could both destabilize and
reaffirm notions of race.
Degeneration, Not Regeneration
Another important point to bear in mind in current discussions
about biosocial research is a curious asymmetry between the fo-
cus on positive and on negative environmental effects. With the
exception of a few studies that highlight the positive effects of
enhanced environments or the possibility of resilience [37], bio-
social research today mostly focuses on the vulnerability of cer-
tain individuals and groups to social and environmental harms
[19]. This imbalance is certainly related to the need to argue for
research funding, which might privilege the study of negative
effects as part of the study of disease aetiology. However, at the
same time, history casts a long shadow and we cannot under-
stand the current focus on harm over improvement as entirely
separate from historical precursors. Indeed, historically, discus-
sions about the plasticity of heredity were much more strongly
characterized by a focus on degeneration [38] than explorations
of regeneration. This is, for example, obvious in the case of ma-
ternal impressions, where the womb was typically seen as the
bearer of a potential misfortune for the foetus, rather than a
possible source of improvement. “The wrong maternal passions
could produce monsters, but there is no legacy, from this era, of
thinking that the right maternal passions could improve the vir-
tue, health, or form of the fetus beyond what it would attain if it
merely remained uninfluenced and uncorrupted” [39, p. 22–23].
However, the uneven focus on degeneration was a much more
widespread bias in perspective. Especially from the early nine-
teenth century onwards, doctors, biologists and social reformers
studying the relationship of environment, body and inheritance
mostly focused on the pathogenic qualities of specific environ-
ments that were considered to render their inhabitants socially
irredeemable and hence a lesser category of citizen over the
course of generations (see Meloni 2016 for a detailed elaboration
on this topic) [19]. Degenerationists believed that a pathogenic
environment acted as a so-called “racial poison”, that is, “a sub-
stance, of whatever nature, which injures the offspring through
the parent or parents, and is thus liable to originate degeneracy
in healthy stocks” [40]. There were many conditions that were
regarded as such poisons and which were assumed to weaken
the germ-line: the overpopulated metropolis of the industrial
revolution, particularly its slums; alcohol; prostitution; sexual
diseases. Degenerationists proposed that, if biological heredity
is open to environmental influences, then the present germline
of historically disadvantaged social or ethnic groups would re-
flect the “debilitating effects of having lived for centuries under
deprived conditions”, as a critic of plastic heredity put it in the
context of Soviet debates on eugenics in 1920s (Filipchenko,
quoted in [19]). From this perspective, the biological effects of
accumulated disadvantage explained the ‘incapacity’ of various
non-White or other socially disadvantaged groups, such as the
“undeserving poor” [41], to catch up with the benefits of societal
progress. Vicious cycles of social disadvantage were thus
explained as an effect of biology, not social oppression, discrim-
ination and stigma.
A very obvious champion of this argument was the Belfast-
born Neo-Lamarckian embryologist Ernest William MacBride
(1866–1940; see [42]). A prominent figure in the British Eugenics
movement, MacBride relied on notions of environmental effects
to create a ‘racial’ typology in which Northern ‘races’ were at
the top. ‘Races’ for MacBride were to be understood as “the em-
bodiment of a whole hierarchy of memories.” Since they
“acquired their characters as a reaction to their different envi-
ronments” [43, p. 241], as MacBride claimed, the Nordic race
learnt its “indomitable courage” in the struggle against the
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“bleak climate of their old home” [43, p. 243]. Conversely, the
Mediterranean race, formed in a less invigorating climate, was
“characterized by a mercurial temperament, prone to quarrel
and quick to take revenge.” Africans, of course, were
“thoroughly tropical animal[s]” [43, p. 242, 244–245]. These
debates were far from being just speculative: these racial stereo-
types were meant to offer a platform to shape social policy and
public health strategies.
Epigenetics and the Emergence of New
Scientific and Social Responsibilities
Why is it important for the epigeneticists of today to be aware
of these histories of biosocial plasticity, heredity, public health
and social policy? With the emergence of environmental epige-
netics, arguments about the plasticity of the body and the
effects of environmental exposures and social experiences are
acquiring new valence today. An emergent “biology of social
adversity” [44] is investigating the multigenerational effects of
toxic exposures, famine, violence and trauma. Related fields,
such as the Developmental Origins of Health and Disease
(DOHaD; [45]), work to increase the scientific and public aware-
ness of emergent arguments about the importance of parental
preconception health for the well-being of future generations
and for public health more broadly. Initial translations into pol-
icy campaigns, such as the First 1000 Days initiatives [46], point
to the possibly significant policy impact of these knowledge
claims. Thus, it is pivotal for researchers in environmental epi-
genetics to understand that their work is inevitably embedded
in a social and political world where conceptualizations of the
body as plastic and malleable by its biosocial environment have
a longstanding and complex political legacy that includes rein-
forcing stigmatization and discrimination against socially vul-
nerable groups. At the same, we should inquire if concepts and
models that have been developed in the second half of the 20th
century in order to address social, ethical and political dimen-
sions of genetic research might need to be readjusted to fit the
novel forms of risk and responsibility that epigenetic perspec-
tives on body, health and illness bring about. The proposition of
transgenerational epigenetic inheritance in particular might
create a demand to rethink notions of responsibility and justice
[47] across generations as it suggests novel timescapes of expo-
sure and experience that interlink “multigenerational lives—
past, present, and future—” [48, p. 17] in complex ways.
From Genetic to Epigenetic Risks and Responsibilities
The Human Genome Project (HGP) was an important milestone,
not only for biology and for advancing our basic biological un-
derstanding of life itself, but also for a more comprehensive and
systematic engagement with the social, political, ethical and
legal implications of biology. In the course of the HGP and the
expansion of genetic and genomic research more generally, gov-
ernments in North America, Europe and elsewhere imple-
mented policies that dedicated a small but significant
percentage of all funding for genomics research to so-called ELSI
or ELSA projects (Ethical, Legal and Social Implications/Aspects).
These projects investigated genetics and genomics research in
the specific social and political context of the late 20th and early
21st century. A main motivation for these investments into
social science and humanities research as part of funding for
the genomic sciences was the worry that the analysis of the
human genome could lead to the resurrection of a biology of
human difference that culminated in the scientific, social and
political atrocities of the social hygiene movements and of fas-
cist regimes in Germany and elsewhere in the first half of the
20th century. For example, while the UNESCO statements on
race in 1950 and 1952 aimed to show that the scientific commu-
nity was dedicated to the social and political equality of all peo-
ple, genetic research often continued to investigate human
difference along traditional categories of social stratification
such as race [49]. Could this research be undertaken without
once again contributing to the division of humanity and the pos-
sible discrimination of specific human groups? How could ge-
netic differences and their health effects be studied without
possibly exposing individuals to social stigma? Social science
and humanities analysis was understood to be integral to efforts
to investigate, identify and discuss social, ethical and political
issues as they arose as part of genetics and genomics research.
Issues that have been and are of ongoing concern to scholars in
the social studies of science and related fields include, for exam-
ple, if genetic research might lead to new forms of genetic es-
sentialism and genetic discrimination, i.e. if individuals or
groups in society might come to be defined and limited by, for
example, a genetic mutation they carry [50, 51]. Other studies
have been exploring what it might mean socially and politically
if new forms of at-risk status are generated by genetic testing
technologies: Which new forms of being affected as individuals,
families and groups are being created through the availability of
genetic tests? Are individuals empowered or imperilled by these
new types of risk information [52, 53]? Still others investigate
how genetic types of health information contribute to the for-
mations of new norms of what counts as rational and responsi-
ble behaviour with regard to health risks, disease prevention
and care for the self, family and society [54, 55]. This type of re-
search is an important contribution to understanding how ge-
netic research impacts society, which kinds of distinctions
between human beings it might create, and what kinds of politi-
cal and legal frameworks are needed to mitigate potentially neg-
ative impacts, particularly on vulnerable groups in society.
Yet, as genetics is increasingly complemented by epigenetic
perspectives on health and illness, notions of health risks shift
in ways that create novel and distinct social and political ques-
tions. To explain this shift, we will briefly compare the specific
characteristics of genetic and epigenetic notions of health risks
and elaborate why this difference is central for understanding
the new forms of social and scientific responsibility that arise
with epigenetic approaches to health, illness and inheritance.
Genetic Risk
The genetics of the late 20th century introduced a new category
of risk—genetic risk—and with it new possibilities for its assess-
ment and management, e.g. through genetic testing. Social sci-
entists and humanities scholars who study these novel
developments proposed that by providing these means to as-
sess genetic risk, genetic research opens up possibilities for
both empowerment and discrimination [56]: a potential for em-
powerment because genetic testing allows for new knowledge
as a basis for preventative action or other life decisions for at-
risk individuals; and a potential for discrimination because it
also allows for genetically ‘damaged’ individuals to be identi-
fied. In the worst-case scenarios of cultural imaginaries during
the HGP, it was feared that genetic science could possibly lead
to structures of extreme societal stratification based on individ-
ual genetic heritage—concerns illustrated popularly by the 1997
movie “GATTACA”, which portrayed a society in which only the
genetically superior were allowed access to education, the job
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market and procreation. Social science studies of those who live
with the knowledge of a genetic mutation, for example a BRCA 1
or 2 mutation, show that their experience of genetic knowledge
and testing technologies is also often characterized by this am-
bivalence [57]. On the one hand, the possibility of genetic testing
is perceived as a life-saving technology. On the other hand, wor-
ries about continued access to health insurance or discrimina-
tion on the job market if the information about their risk
became known are also part of their experiences [53]. These
worries are, depending on the national context, more or less
substantiated [58, 59].
At the advent of the HGP, it was assumed that genetic risk
would explain the distribution and clustering of common dis-
eases such as cardiovascular disease, diabetes and cancer.
However, it is widely recognized that this hope did not come
true [60] and, despite the existence of personal genomics
products and projects such as 23andMe, genetic risk as a
public discourse and as a health care concern is today largely
confined to a few specific high-risk groups, such as families
with histories of breast and ovarian cancer or Huntington’s
disease (although, of course, this might change in the future
should a larger number of relevant mutations be identified
through new technological or other scientific advances). What
is crucial is that these groups and families can be found in
different social locations in society, with different class and
ethnic backgrounds.
Discourses about the social responsibilities connected to ge-
netic risk thus also remain largely confined to at-risk families
and the genetic clinics that work with them. Common discus-
sions about responsibilities in this context concern, first, the
flipside of the opportunity to know one’s risk and engage in pre-
vention, for example, whether specific family members have
the right not to know about or not to engage in medical preven-
tion in cases where risk has been established [61]. Second, ques-
tions arise about whether one must inform other family
members of a possibly at-risk status and if one’s reproductive
choices should be influenced by genetic risk information [62].
And third, the first two points often become linked to larger dis-
cussions about whether at-risk individuals have an obligation
towards society to address their health risks in a responsible
way, which is often equated with practices of knowing and
sharing risk information and engaging in prevention, in order to
save health care costs and be responsible citizens [57]. Social
science research indicates that discussions of guilt and individ-
ual failings remain largely confined to these three levels of re-
sponsibility. They do not become, however, linked to the
disease risk itself: whether one does or does not carry a genetic
mutation is largely interpreted as fate and hence beyond indi-
vidual control.
Epigenetic Risk
What changes now if we move from a genetic to an epigenetic
perspective on risk? Epigenetics introduces new forms of risk
that are not linked to the gene per se, but to its relationship
with the environment. Just like the environment itself, epige-
netic risk is thus dispersed and omnipresent. In a sense, it con-
cerns everyone. Everyone lives in an environment that might
affect their epigenome. However, epigenetic risk is, at the same
time, strongly related to the social conditions of our lives: the
contexts we live in and the ways we live in them. This leads to
a key difference between genetic and epigenetic risk: as epige-
netic risk becomes linked to life circumstances, it holds the
potential to discriminate between people along traditional cate-
gories of social segregation that impact their life circumstances
[63, 64].
In the beginning of this section, we revisited how the genetic
sciences of the late 20th century worked hard to explicitly set
themselves apart from one of their historical precursors: eugen-
ics. Eugenics assumed that different groups in society had dif-
ferent biological properties. Positive eugenics, which was
prominent, for example, in South America, assumed that better
life circumstances would improve human biology and hence
worked on improving hygiene, medical care and education to
improve the population. Negative eugenics, which is what we
mostly think of when we say eugenics, aimed to exclude those
who were deemed biologically inferior from reproduction, often
violently, while encouraging other groups to reproduce [65].
Historians of science have shown that it was key for the emerg-
ing genetic sciences after WWII to emphasize how they were
different from eugenics (see [49] for a critical overview). A key
message of the HGP, for example, was: On a genetic level, all
humans are pretty much the same. Post WWII genetics also
cast itself as a humanitarian project that lent unity to the hu-
man race after the atrocities of the first half of the 20th century.
With regard to the health sciences, the major research object it
produced—the genetic mutation—turned out to mostly work
within this framework, as it appeared as dispersed among
different groups in society. Nevertheless, a focus on genetic
mutations also enabled new forms of discrimination and stig-
matization by introducing novel at-risk groups (as discussed in
the previous section), and in some cases forged associations
between specific genetic health risks and distinct social groups,
as illustrated, for example, by the long-held assumptions that
African–Americans have a higher risk of cardiovascular disease
due to genetic factors, a hypothesis that has come to be increas-
ingly challenged in the life sciences [66].
Environmental epigenetics and particularly the proposition
of transgenerational epigenetic inheritance, however, already
challenges the aspirational ideal of sameness that was founda-
tional to modern genetics [19]. Social location comes to matter
for physical and mental health outcomes through its effects
on gene expression—potentially across generations. While
studies often aim to point out the health impacts of possibly
unjust living conditions, at the same time they run the risk of
defining already disadvantaged groups in society as biologi-
cally different and disadvantaged. Jo¨rg Niewo¨hner [67] referred
to this as a potential “molecularization of biography and
milieu” that might emerge with epigenetics. This ambivalence
is a challenge that epigeneticists will have to face, particularly
as research from their field becomes increasingly important
for public health [68].
Epigenetic Responsibilities
As with genetics, insights from epigenetics can present both
means of empowerment—to understand the links between so-
cial location and health outcomes—but also means of possible
discrimination [69, 70]. Individuals and groups exposed to
certain socio-material experiences are understood to be marked
as biologically different at the level of gene expression. As we
have shown, historically marking specific social groups as bio-
logically different has mostly been to their disadvantage. Rather
than leading to the betterment of their living conditions, it has
often served to legitimate existing social hierarchies [71].
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In contemporary environmental epigenetics, numerous
studies using animal models and human cohorts currently ex-
plore how trauma, deprivation and exposures affect physical
and mental health in later life and across generations. While
their insights are unquestionably important, from a social sci-
ence perspective a key question is: Will these studies contribute
to the betterment of living conditions or increase the stigma
and discrimination that disadvantaged groups are often already
facing? Certainly, the answer to this question will highly de-
pend on the social and political development of our societies,
which has in many countries taken a downturn when it comes
to the commitment to social solidarity, inclusion and the shar-
ing of wealth and resources across societal strata. However, sci-
entists, too, have an important responsibility to consider the
social context of their work when they design and conduct their
studies and interpret their results. The biological in general and
the molecular in particular hold a certain power: in our socie-
ties, phenomena that can be traced to the materiality of the bio-
logical and the molecular are often considered to be more real
and credible than descriptions based on other data alone [4].
Even if certain correlations between life circumstances and
health might have been known before, they gain weight as there
is molecular ‘proof’. That goes hand in hand with a certain re-
sponsibility on the part of life science researchers. Exactly what
phenomena am I making real with my research? Which catego-
ries do I use to describe and label that which I seek to explore?
Which silent assumptions about the social world might I inte-
grate into my research designs and the interpretation of my
results, possibly without further reflection? Have I considered
the possible social and political implications of my work in the
way I communicate my results?
However, the degree to which life science researchers—indi-
vidually and as research communities—can engage with such
questions is highly dependent on the social organisation of the
scientific system as such, particularly on its reward and incen-
tive structures [72]. Currently, the scientific system and its fund-
ing and career structures tend to encourage a focus on fast-
paced scientific work that aims to score well in terms of quanti-
tative performance metrics such as the Journal Impact Factor
[73]. As has been discussed in much greater detail elsewhere,
one of the often-detrimental effects of this orientation are spe-
cific time-regimes of work that discourage scientists from en-
gaging in activities that will not be easily translatable into the
next high-impact paper [74]. This effect is particularly pro-
nounced for current postdoctoral and tenure-track scholars
who are in the process of building a career in science and who
constitute the next generation of the scientific leaders of the
field. Yet, socially and politically important and challenging
fields such as environmental epigenetics clearly point to the
limits of the kinds of work that can be accomplished within the
current normative structure of science. Time-pressured and
impact-factor-oriented modes of work make it difficult for life
scientists (and researchers in other fields, too!) to devote time
to reflection, interdisciplinary exchange, experimental re-
designs and the slow work of crafting and communicating re-
search results cautiously and responsibly.
Nevertheless, as research in environmental epigenetics is so
intimately tied to the social world, it will be crucial to enable
processes of exploring its social and political dimensions before,
during and after the research process. Research funders will
play a particularly important role in this process, as will institu-
tional leaders, in both funding and rewarding careful research
proposals that also include explorations across disciplinary
boundaries that seek to responsibly account for the biosocial
nature of research in environmental epigenetics. Particularly for
research that explores the biological impact of unequal living
conditions and experiences across generations—may it be in a
model organism or in cohort studies—it will be of uttermost im-
portance to engage with its inherent connections to questions
of social and environmental justice. Below, we want to highlight
just two aspects that are particularly important to consider at
the intersection of social justice and transgenerational epige-
netic inheritance.
Individual and Collective Responsibility
Social and bioethical studies of science [63, 75, 76] have indi-
cated that exploring the molecular aspects of a social issue of-
ten leads to locating the responsibility for addressing this issue
on the level of individual instead of the level of society. In the
case of environmental pollution, for example, the polluted land-
scapes and elements might fade out of perspective and the fo-
cus rests on the specific chemical that individuals need to avoid
contact with in order to ensure their own health and well-being
and/or that of future generations [77]. In the case of nutrition,
food often becomes viewed as an individual choice instead of a
complex social phenomenon [78]. The focus on the molecular
thus often tends to shift attention away from the complexities
of society to the actions of the individual. While this can be po-
litically powerful in terms of enabling individual agency, it also
means that more collective questions and answers are often
neglected. Swedish political scientist Maria Hedlund [75]
reminds us that it will be pivotal to discuss epigenetic responsi-
bility on the collective level—that environmental pollution is
not considered as something that needs to be managed by the
individual, but as something for which states and companies
are held responsible. Similarly, questions of nutrition and
lifestyle cannot be negotiated at the scale of the individual
alone. Socially stratified patterns of food intake also need to be
understood as expressions of distinct social hierarchies and the
unequal distribution of social, political and economic resources.
Approaches that seek solutions on the individual scale alone of-
ten end up holding the most vulnerable members of our society
responsible for improving their own health and that of future
generations without addressing the structures that significantly
contribute to creating the problem [68]. The environmental epi-
genetics research community can contribute to a more complex
understanding of epigenetic responsibilities across generations
by considering how they themselves frame the problems they
seek to address, which contexts they consider in their experi-
mental designs and how they interpret their findings.
Studying Harm without Exploring Reversibility
We have outlined that in the history of biosocial approaches to
body, health and inheritance, studies often focused on the neg-
ative effects of certain exposures, with much less attention
given to exploring reversibility and the effects of positive envi-
ronments. As we briefly discussed before, a similar trend has
become visible in contemporary environmental epigenetics re-
search. While it is of course of uttermost importance to under-
stand the detrimental effects of environmental toxins, trauma
or other biosocial exposures, it is equally important to consider
the possible social impact of scientific research focused often
almost exclusively on harm. Bioethical discussions about ge-
netic testing posed the question of whether testing should be
available if there is neither a cure nor the possibility of preven-
tion, as for example in the case of Huntington’s disease [79].
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While insights from environmental epigenetics holds the pros-
pect of banishing or avoiding detrimental exposures in the fu-
ture [63, 75], the question emerges of whether there is a
retrospective responsibility towards already affected individu-
als to invest more in studies of reversibility. On a societal level,
it needs to be considered if a message of damage without hope
of reversibility might contribute to the stigmatization of individ-
uals and groups, potentially across generations. While studies
of reversibility alone are no cure for the possibility of discrimi-
nation [80] and potential suggestions of social or medical inter-
ventions based on notions of reversibility will need to be
carefully scrutinized regarding their social and political
impacts, more attention to questions of reversibility in the
study of (heritable) epigenetic effects can be an important step.
Interdisciplinary Collaboration as a Practice of
Responsibility
We have highlighted these two questions as they are particu-
larly important challenges for science and society in the context
of environmental epigenetics in general, and specifically with
regard to the proposition of transgenerational epigenetic inheri-
tance. They are challenges that life science researchers need to
become more aware of, but, at the same time, we believe that
they do require engagement from across the disciplines in order
to be addressed productively. Together with a growing number
of social scientists, humanities scholars and life scientists, we
propose that epigenetic research and, particularly, work on
such a sensitive topic as transgenerational epigenetic inheri-
tance needs interdisciplinary exchange and collaboration to
thrive responsibly. To date, there are a few initiatives where
scholars from these different fields have to come together to
work on integrating social science perspectives that foreground
questions of social responsibility, justice and equity into
research designs and the interpretations of studies [70]. These
forms of collaboration require bringing together expertise from
disciplines that might appear radically different and which
might focus on topics that seem very distant from each other at
first glance—such as gene regulation, methylation patterns,
cellular signal cascades, social structure, war trauma, racism,
gender discrimination or agrarian economics. But it is the power
and the challenge of a field like environmental epigenetics that
it works on topics that intersect the social and the biological
world so profoundly that all of these different types of expertise
might need to interact to make sense of the complex phenom-
ena that environmental epigenetics seeks to describe. Thus, we
argue for forms of engagement that build on combining differ-
ent types of expertise and exchanging perspectives, but that
are, at the same time, open to transformative processes that
might profoundly alter the viewpoints with which each partici-
pant has entered the engagement. In recent decades, interdisci-
plinary collaboration, particularly in an ELSI/ELSA mode, was
often conceived of or could practically only be conducted as a
form of social science research alongside life science inquiry.
The social sciences’ contribution was thus often limited to offer-
ing a critique of life science research from the outside or to
addressing possible downstream problems after the facts had
been established. This continued separation has been criticised
by many social scientists as insufficient for addressing the inher-
ent social and political character of life science research (see e.g.
[81, 82]). A field such as environmental epigenetics that brings to-
gether the social and biological in such complex ways makes it
even more apparent that such a mode of engagement built on cri-
tique from the outside alone and persistent disciplinary
separation is not enough. Hence, we envision more integrative
processes of collaboration in which scholars from different disci-
plines participate in the design, conduct and interpretation of
experiments and studies. Becoming aware of the troublesome
histories of biosocial research must be an essential part of such
processes in order to not repeat historical injustices.
Responsibility literally means the ‘ability to respond’.
Responsibility is thus in its essence a doing, a practice. The
practice of responding well to the challenges and potentials of en-
vironmental epigenetics and transgenerational epigenetic in-
heritance will require pooling our resources across the
disciplines and working together to understand life and inheri-
tance in all its social and biological complexity. It will require
developing a new language that goes beyond simple notions of
determinism, whether social or biological, and that can begin to
address the interplay between social and biological life as al-
ways already a scientific and a political question. The intent,
then, of interdisciplinary conversations and collaboration is to
render scholars in different disciplines articulate in ways that
allow them to speak across disciplinary divides to explore the
biosocial aspects of life in ways that live up to these inherent
political responsibilities.
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